Reinforcement Learning Based Penetration Testing of a Microgrid Control
  Algorithm by Neal, Christopher et al.
Reinforcement Learning Based Penetration Testing
of a Microgrid Control Algorithm
Christopher Neal∗, Hanane Dagdougui†, Andrea Lodi†, and Jose´ Fernandez∗
∗Department of Computer and Software Engineering
†Department of Mathematics and Industrial Engineering
Polytechnique Montreal, Montreal, Canada
{christopher.neal, hanane.dagdougui, andrea.lodi, jose.fernandez}@polymtl.ca
Abstract—Microgrids (MGs) are small-scale power systems
which interconnect distributed energy resources and loads
within clearly defined regions. However, the digital infrastruc-
ture used in an MG to relay sensory information and perform
control commands can potentially be compromised due to a
cyberattack from a capable adversary. An MG operator is
interested in knowing the inherent vulnerabilities in their system
and should regularly perform Penetration Testing (PT) activities
to prepare for such an event. PT generally involves looking
for defensive coverage blindspots in software and hardware
infrastructure, however the logic in control algorithms which
act upon sensory information should also be considered in PT
activities. This paper demonstrates a case study of PT for an
MG control algorithm by using Reinforcement Learning (RL)
to uncover malicious input which compromises the effectiveness
of the controller. Through trial-and-error episodic interactions
with a simulated MG, we train an RL agent to find malicious
input which reduces the effectiveness of the MG controller.
Index Terms—microgrid, cybersecurity, false data injection,
penetration testing, mathematical optimization, reinforcement
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Penetration Testing (PT) is the process of performing
an authorized attack on a system in order to uncover its
vulnerabilities or to witness how the system will act in the
presence of an attack [1]. This is an accepted activity which is
practiced by specialized professionals, studied by academia,
and has become an established industry for assessing the
defensive posture of a system. Automated PT tools, such as
MetaSploit, can aid in the process, however current tools rely
upon handcrafted attack rules developed by a programmer and
guided by a domain expert [2]. This paper proposes the use of
a form of Artificial Intelligence (AI) known as Reinforcement
Learning (RL) as a methodology to automate the generation
of PT attacks and evaluates this approach using attacks on a
simulated Microgrid (MG).
MGs are small-scale electrical distribution networks which
can generate, store, and supply local consumers through the
use of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) (e.g. photo-
voltaic solar panels, wind turbines, diesel generators) and
Energy Storage Systems (ESSs) (e.g. batteries) [3], [4]. MGs
may act autonomously in island-mode or they can operate
in grid-connected mode where they can exchange electricity
with the main electrical grid, with the capacity to realize
a transition between the two modes. The adoption of MGs
introduces a number of cybersecurity concerns, since the
operation of an MG is generally performed by digital devices
over wireless networks [5]. MGs are an example of a Cyber-
Physical System (CPS), where there are physical processes
controlled by cyber/digital-based software [6]. This type of
environment provides a useful arena for witnessing the impact
of cyberattacks, since the effect of an attack can be directly
measured by the physical processes in operation. This paper
considers training an RL agent to craft False Data Injection
(FDI) attacks which modify the input values provided to a Mi-
crogrid Central Controller (MGCC) operating in a simulated
MG. The methodology utilized here to find vulnerabilities in
an MGCC could be extended to networked MGs or other
Industrial Control System (ICS) environments.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
PT is one of several activities in establishing a defensive
posture of a computing-reliant system, such as an MG.
An initial defense in securing an MG involves adhering
to best practices outlined by industry norms. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has outlined
standard cybersecurity vulnerability classes for Smart Grids
and MGs [7]. The Sandia National Laboratories encourages
the use of a defense-in-depth MG infrastructure architecture
in preparation for potential attacks [8]. The Mitre Corporation
has expanded its ATT&CK framework to consider typical
attack tactics and techniques in ICSs, such as MGs [9], [10].
Despite an organization’s best efforts, various attack vec-
tors are likely to exist through vulnerable components in
MG installations, including Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs), Smart Meters, Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs),
and Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) [8], [11]. These com-
ponents are susceptible to malware delivery, software mis-
configuration, Denial-of-Service (DoS), and eavesdropping
over Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) networks. Compromised reporting devices can be
subjugated to FDI attacks, which involves sending falsified
values amongst MG devices with malicious intent. FDI
attacks have been studied for MGs [12]–[14], along with
defensive measures [15]–[17]. Although precautions should
be taken in securing reporting devices in an MG, it is wise to
consider the scenario where devices may be compromised and
report falsified data to control algorithms. Experimentation
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with MG attacks and defenses using testbeds can be used to
this end without causing any negative real-world effects [18],
[19].
This paper considers training an RL agent to learn an
effective attack strategy in a simulated MG environment.
Successes in RL-based game-playing agents for Go [20] and
StarCraft II [21] have shown the ability of RL agents to
uncover strategy-spaces not considered by the best human
players, which also may be the case for PT activities.
RL can be characterized as a form of statistical learning
where an agent learns to perform actions in an environment
with the goal of maximizing some notion of long-term reward
[22]. The agent’s goal is to learn a near-optimal policy pi,
through repeated trial-and-error episodic interactions with an
environment. There is a balance to be played in exploring un-
seen decision-spaces while exploiting known ‘good’ decision-
spaces. RL problems are often modelled as some form of a
Markov Decision Process (MDP), where there exists a set
of states S, a set of actions A, the probability Pa(s, s′) to
transition from state s to state s′ given action a, and the
reward Ra(s, s′) for transitioning from state s to s′ using
action a. Formulating PT activities as an RL problem involves
defining the testbed environment’s state, the set of actions
an attacking agent can perform, the reward that the agent
receives for taking actions, and a method for updating the
agent’s policy. Using RL for PT has been previously proposed
for traditional Information Technology (IT) environments
[23]–[25], however this is the first attempt, to our knowledge,
to use RL for PT of an MG control algorithm.
III. REFERENCE MICROGRID TESTBED
A. Microgrid Architecture
This paper considers a small residential MG consisting of a
Photovoltaic (PV) system (i.e. solar panel), a Battery Energy
Storage System (BESS), and three households acting as
fluctuating loads over time (Fig. 1). The solar panel generates
electricity relative to the sun’s solar irradiance and is used
to supply electricity to the households. Excess electricity
generated by the solar panel can either be sold to the grid
operator or stored in the BESS to be used at a later time.
Note that the MG is connected to the main electrical grid via
a grid-connected transformer. Should the MG not be able to
satisfy the load demand, electricity can be bought from the
grid operator. The MGCC receives sensory information about
the given state of the MG and determines control actions to
satisfy the electrical load while minimizing total cost.
This paper uses an MG configuration that comes with
MATLAB/Simulink as the simulation environment [26]. This
model has been considerably modified to enable the uti-
lization of custom controller logic and the ability to insert
falsified values from simulated attacks. Controlling this MG
involves switching the battery into an ON or OFF state. There
are four control scenarios which are dictated by how much
power is being generated by the solar panel (see Table I).
By default, any generated solar power is used to satisfy the
load. Any excess solar power can be utilized to charge the
battery or can be sold to the main grid. When there is a deficit
Microgrid Central Controller (MGCC)
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Fig. 1. Microgrid Architecture
TABLE I
BATTERY CONTROL SCENARIOS
Battery ON Battery OFF
Solar Power ≥ Load Charge battery Sell to grid
Solar Power < Load Discharge battery Buy from grid
between the solar power and the load, this missing quantity
can be met from the battery reserve or can be bought from
the grid. Note that in reality, other battery control scenarios
would exist. For example, a combination of grid and battery
power could be used to satisfy the load, or, any excess solar
power could be split to have a portion charge the battery and
have the other portion sold to the grid. These scenarios are
not considered to favor a more tractable simulation setting.
Simulation scenarios are run for this MG by loading in
comma-separated-values (CSV) files for the solar irradiance,
household loads, electricity selling price, and electricity buy-
ing price.
B. Optimization Based Controller
The controller is tasked with satisfying the load demand
while minimizing the total cost. Purchasing power from the
grid increases the total cost and selling excess power re-
duces the total cost. No preexisting controller software could
be readily used in this MG simulation, hence a controller
based on mathematical optimization has been developed using
CPLEX and the OPL language [27]. At each hour in the
simulation, the controller is provided an input set describing
the state X and determines the control set Y to drive the MG
in a cost-effective manner. This process is outlined in Fig. 2.
Controller
State
X
Control
Y
Environment
Fig. 2. Control Loop Overview
At each timestep the controller is provided the current state
values as well as forecasted values over a time window of
length T = 24. The controller determines the optimal control
actions over the entire time horizon and then sends the control
signal to the MG for the current timestep.
The state is initially defined as X = {PL, PP ,ΛB ,ΛS , b}.
The set PL = {pL1 , pL2 , ..., pLT } is the expected cumulative
load power demand values from the households over the
window, where pL1 is the initial load power and p
L
2 , ..., p
L
T
are the forecasted loads. The set PP = {pP1 , pP2 , ..., pPT } is
the expected generated photovoltaic solar power values over
the control horizon, where pP1 is the initial solar power and
pP2 , ..., p
P
T are the forecasted values. The buying and selling
prices over the window are ΛB = {λB1 , λB2 , ..., λBT } and
ΛS = {λS1 , λS2 , ..., λST }, respectively. The initial battery state
of charge is b.
To simplify the control problem, the basic formulation
is updated by using PL, PP , ΛB , and ΛS to precalculate
two new sets, Costs C and Differences D. These sets are
calculated using Algorithm 1.
In the algorithm, the value et is a temporary variable to
hold the difference between the solar power and load demand
at time t. The value ct indicates how the overall cost of the
controller is affected at time t. If ct < 0 there is a surplus
of solar power that can be sold to the grid and if ct > 0
there is a shortfall of solar power which can be bought from
the grid. The value dt indicates how the state of charge of
the battery is affected at time t. The constant ω represents
the maximum power quantity of the battery and is used to
convert the battery power to a percentage, representing the
battery’s state of charge. If dt < 0 there is shortfall of solar
power which can be retrieved from the battery and if dt > 0
there is an excess of solar power which can be supplied to the
battery. The optimization problem will determine at each time
t to either update the controller’s total cost by taking quantity
ct or update the battery’s state charge by taking quantity dt.
The updated version of the state is X = {C,D, b}
Algorithm 1: Construct Costs and Differences sets
C := ∅
D := ∅
for t = 1 to T do
et := p
P
t − pLt
if et ≥ 0 then
ct := −λSt et
else
ct := −λBt et
end
dt = et/ω
C := C ∪ ct
D := D ∪ dt
end
return C, D
Consider the example sets PP = {160, 140, 100, 0},
PL = {100, 120, 170, 250}, ΛB = {3, 3, 2, 2}, and ΛS =
{1, 1, 1, 1}, with ω = 10. The algorithm will return C =
{−60,−20, 140, 500} and D = {6, 2,−7,−25}.
The controller uses the state X as input to calculate the
control set Y = {Y, Y¯ , B}. The set Y = {y1, y2, ..., yT }
is the expected set of control commands over the control
horizon, where yt = 1 implies that the battery is expected
to be in an ON state at time t and yt = 0 implies that the
battery is expected to be in an OFF state at time t. The set
Y¯ = {y¯1, y¯2, ..., y¯T } is a control variable which represents
the opposite of the battery control and can be considered as
the grid control command. If yt = 1, then y¯t = 0, and vice
versa. This is required to solve the controller’s optimization
problem which is a Mixed Integer Linear Programming
(MILP) problem. The set B = {b1, b2, ..., bT } is the predicted
battery state of charge over the window and is calculated to
ascertain the battery capacity constraints are satisfied. After
solving for Y , Y¯ , and B, the command value y1 is provided
to the system as the invoked control in the simulation. The
simulation will then proceed to execute until the next hour
where the process is repeated, and so on.
At each timestep, the controller is given X and solves Equa-
tion (1) by choosing Y which minimizes the cost function f ,
subject to satisfying the set of operating constraints g.
min cost = min
Y
f(X,Y) (1a)
s.t. g(X,Y) ≤ 0. (1b)
The fully expanded optimization control problem is mod-
elled by Equation (2):
min
Y,Y¯ ∈{0,1}T ,B∈RT+
T∑
t=1
y¯tct (2a)
s.t. b0 = b (2b)
for t = 1, ..., T
bt = bt−1 + ytdt∆τ (2c)
yt + y¯t = 1 (2d)
bmin ≤ bt ≤ bmax. (2e)
Equation (2a) states that the total controller’s cost is the
sum of the values ct when the battery is OFF (i.e. y¯t = 1
and yt = 0). Equation (2b) sets the initial battery state of
charge. Equation (2c) states that the battery state of charge
at time t is equal to the previous charge plus the value dt if
the battery is ON (i.e. yt = 1 and y¯t = 0), times the length
of the step time ∆τ . Equation (2d) is used to ensure that the
battery is either in an ON or OFF state. Lastly, Equation (2e)
keeps the battery state of charge within its allowed operating
range, where bmax is the battery’s maximum state of charge
and bmin is the battery’s minimum state of charge.
C. Threat Model
We assume the attacker to be a skilled adversary which
has the capability to undermine the MG’s digital-based in-
frastructure in such a way they can modify the controller’s
input X. The attacker can insert a malicious set of input AX,
as shown in Equation (3), into the state values so that the
controller receives the updated set XA as input:
XA = X+ AX. (3)
This paper specifically considers the case where the at-
tacker modifies the initial battery state of charge that is
reported to the controller. The attacker’s problem of choosing
malicious input can be represented as a Bilevel Programming
Problem (BPP), where the attacker constructs an input which
subverts the goal of the controller and intends to maximize
the total cost of the controller. Consider the attack shown in
Equation (4) where the attacker determines some value ab to
add to the initial battery state of charge b, in order to create
an attacked initial battery state of charge bA, which will be
used by the controller in its control problem.
max
ab∈R,bA∈R+
T∑
t=1
y¯tct (4a)
s.t. bA = b+ ab (4b)
ab
min ≤ ab ≤ abmax (4c)
bmin ≤ bA ≤ bmax (4d)
min
Y,Y¯ ∈{0,1}T ,B∈RT+
T∑
t=1
y¯tct (4e)
s.t. b0 = bA (4f)
for t = 1, ..., T
bt = bt−1 + ytdt∆τ (4g)
yt + y¯t = 1 (4h)
bmin ≤ bt ≤ bmax. (4i)
BPPs are hard to solve to optimality since they are gen-
erally non-convex, non-differentiable, and have been shown
to be at least NP-hard [28]. However, it is in the interest
of an MG operator to understand which malicious values
could be inserted into their system and have it operate in
a sub-optimal manner. Due to the difficulty of solving such
BPPs, this paper proposes the use of RL as a metaheuristic
to uncover approximate optimal solutions to this MG attack
problem.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
The MG simulation uses CSV files as input parameters
of household loads, solar irradiance, electricity purchasing
prices, and electricity selling prices. All the experiments use
identical input from an example period of 48 hours. The
household loads come from a freely accessible dataset of
one minute samples of household power consumption from
a household in Sceaux, France over a four year period [29].
The three MG households are represented by the days of
October 6-7, 2008, October 12-13, 2009, and October 11-12,
2010. These represent typical 48-hour electricity usage and
summed together are considered as the load of the MG. Solar
irradiance data could not be found from Sceaux, France, so
solar data was taken from a sunny day in Ottawa, Canada
for the days of July 20-21, 2015 [30]. Although, the data
sources do not come from the same location, taken together
they form an interesting scenario and demonstrate the abilities
of the controller.
As the simulation runs, the controller invokes a command
at each hour. The cost accrued over the simulation is cal-
culated for each minute, based on whether electricity was
bought or sold over the minute. Buying electricity increases
the cost, while selling electricity decreases the cost. The
buying price varies throughout the day at fixed intervals
(similarly to some real-world consumer electrical prices [31]):
• Off-peak: 6.5 cents/kWh (19:00-07:00)
• Mid-peak: 9.4 cents/kWh (07:00-12:00, 17:00-19:00)
• On-peak: 13.4 cents/kWh (12:00-17:00)
Any excess power can be sold to the grid at a fixed price.
• Constant: 5.0 cents/kWh
At each hour in the simulation, the controller receives the
current loads, solar irradiance, and prices, as well as their
forecasts for the next 24 hours. The forecasts are 100%
accurate in these experiments and the controller has perfect
information to work with. The controller is also given the
current reported battery state of charge. The controller solves
Equation (2) each hour to determine the command to invoke.
The battery is restricted to operating between 75%-100%
of its capacity. This prevents the controller from utilizing
all available power and not maintaining any reserves for an
emergency.
When the controller runs in normal operating conditions
without any attack present, we get the results shown in Fig. 3.
The reported battery state of charge match with the actual
battery charge. The controller algorithm reduces the overall
operating cost by performing peak shaving which utilizes the
battery power to offset peak load demand in the evening.
B. Attack Training Results
This paper’s threat model assumes that an attacker has
the ability to modify the battery state of charge b, which is
passed to the controller algorithm. The RL learning agent
is tasked in determining what is the value to provide to
the controller as input, causing the controller to make sub-
optimal decisions and increase the overall cost incurred. We
utilize an implementation of the Temporal Difference (TD)
Advantage Actor-Critic algorithm [32], since the RL agent’s
action involves choosing a continuous value [33], [34].
An episode consists of a two-day period with K = 48 total
hourly timesteps where the RL agent makes a decision. For
each hourly timestep k = 1, ...,K, the RL agent receives the
state sk = {bk, ck, dk, pLk , pPk }, where bk is the current battery
state of charge, ck is the cost value over the current hour, dk
is the difference value over the current hour, pLk is the current
load power, and pPk is the current solar power. The algorithm
samples an action from the current policy to determine the
value ab to add to b. The input is provided to the controller
and the simulation runs until the next hourly timestep. The
total cost of the controller over the hour is summed (and
multiplied by 1000), then returned as the reward rk along
Fig. 3. Scenario: No attack. Score: $2.74. Avg Batt Charge: 79.301%
with the new state of the system s′k. The actor-critic networks
are updated to minimize the actor and critic total loss, with
the goal of finding optimal weight parameters for maximizing
the total reward.
Fig. 4 shows the cumulative reward of the trained RL agent
over 1000 episodes. This agent is permitted to choose any
value for ab, while respecting the requirement that the state of
charge must remain between 75% and 100%. The cumulative
reward trends upward as the agent learns an effective strategy
for this scenario, converging near a value of 4600.
Fig. 4. Training of RL agent which can choose any value for the battery
charge
For comparison, another agent was trained which only has
the ability to modify the reported battery state of charge by
plus or minus 5 percent of the actual battery state of charge.
These training results are not shown, however the capability
of this agent in increasing the total cost is more limited and
there is a more gradual convergence.
C. Attack Analysis
The trained RL agents from Section IV-B are used to attack
the reported battery state of charge level sent to the controller
algorithm. Fig. 5 shows a scenario with an initial battery state
of charge of 80% and where the RL agent can choose any
value for ab such that 75% ≤ bA ≤ 100%. The attacker
generally reports that the battery state of charge is near the
allowed lower bound of 75%, causing the controller to believe
there is little reserves to be used to satisfy the load. The
effect is that the controller is less effective at performing
peak shaving, causing the battery to not offset the demand,
and the state of charge of the battery to rise. The overall score
is substantially higher than the same scenario in Fig. 3 where
there is no attack.
A more detailed analysis of the behavior of the attacking
agents is provided in Table II. Attacks are carried out in
the simulation over the 48-hour period with different initial
battery state of charge levels. Each scenario is run 10 times
and the values are averaged. In general, the attacking agents
report a battery state of charge as low as possible. This causes
the controller to not use its reserve battery power to supply
the load and hence the overall battery charge increases.
D. Discussion
The implemented MG testbed is simplistic by design and
enables the goal of training RL agents to perform PT activities
on a MG control algorithm. This paper demonstrates an
Fig. 5. Scenario: Attack reported battery charge (75% ≤ bA ≤ 100%). Score: $4.55. Avg Batt Charge: 85.262%
TABLE II
SIMULATION RESULTS FOR 48-HOUR PERIOD WITH VARYING INITIAL BATTERY CHARGE VALUES AND ATTACK SCENARIOS
Init. Batt. Charge: 75% Init. Batt. Charge: 80%
Attack Cost ($) Cost Incr. Avg Charge Avg Reported Cost ($) Cost Incr. Avg Charge Avg Reported
None 3.62 - 79.64% 79.62% 2.74 - 79.30% 79.30%
bA + /− 5% 3.95 +9.17% 80.80% 79.44% 3.41 +24.45% 82.21% 80.18%
75% ≤ bA ≤ 100% 4.13 +14.22% 80.47% 78.99% 3.83 +39.83% 83.08% 78.62%
Init. Batt. Charge: 85% Init. Batt. Charge: 90%
Attack Cost ($) Cost Incr. Avg Charge Avg Reported Cost ($) Cost Incr. Avg Charge Avg Reported
None 2.48 - 82.58% 82.58% 1.87 - 83.94% 83.99%
bA + /− 5% 2.97 +19.67% 86.36% 82.22% 2.47 +31.99% 88.24% 83.79%
75% ≤ bA ≤ 100% 4.41 +77.76% 89.80% 77.20% 4.60 +146.47% 95.46% 76.39%
Init. Batt. Charge: 95% Init. Batt. Charge: 100%
Attack Cost ($) Cost Incr. Avg Charge Avg Reported Cost ($) Cost Incr. Avg Charge Avg Reported
None 1.58 - 86.07% 86.14% 1.06 - 87.30% 87.39%
bA + /− 5% 1.74 +10.63% 88.29% 84.28% 1.45 +36.41% 90.08% 85.64%
75% ≤ bA ≤ 100% 4.65 +194.97% 100.00% 76.10% 4.75 +348.15% 100.00% 76.03%
approach of formalizing a control algorithm and then uses
RL experimentation to understand its vulnerabilities. This
serves as an introductory study of this approach, however
more insights could be derived from a more realistic MG
environment. Some areas to consider include having a greater
number of MG components, arranging the MG in a radial
lateral configuration, using networked MGs, and considering
the effects of voltage regulation activities. Additionally, the
described testbed is purely a simulation of a few MG compo-
nents and their dynamics. More insights could be attained by
simulating a communications network and even incorporating
actual controller software or hardware.
The results from the experiments show that an attack which
is able to report a lower battery state of charge than what it
is in reality, will have the most impact on the effectiveness
of the given controller algorithm. This result may seem intu-
itive, however the proposed experimental process concretely
verifies this intuition and would guide a potential defender
in prioritizing resources. Performing such an activity in a
more complex MG, or any ICS, environment may yield more
profound and unidentified conclusions.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a framework for performing PT ac-
tivities against MG control algorithms using RL and has
been applied to a simulated MG as a case study. The MG
architecture is implemented in MATLAB/Simulink and is
controlled by an algorithm formulated as an MILP which
is implemented using CPLEX. The threat model identifies
the reported battery state of charge as a threat vector and
RL based agents are trained to learn how to modify this
value to negatively affect the effectiveness of the controller.
The generated attacks show that reducing the reported battery
state of charge to the controller has the largest impact on its
overall performance. This PT framework could be applied
to networked MGs and other ICS environments to uncover
inherent vulnerabilities in control algorithms.
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